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ABSTRACT
We analyze the environmental impact of capital inflows and investigate the halo effect
(FDI improves the environment). We control for the type of FDI inflows, the EKC
(Environmental Kuznets Curve) effect and country income level, and find (i) a differential
industry effect: while total foreign investment in aggregate has a negative effect on all
countries, this can be traced in particular to capital flows to manufacturing and
nonfinancial services sectors.; (ii) an income inequality effect: foreign investment flowing
into poorer countries has harmful effects on environment consistent with the race-to-the
bottom argument, while capital flowing to richer countries has a beneficial effect and
supports the halo effect; (iii) the EKC effect depends on the sector absorbing the FDI
and again income level of the country. We show that studies relying only on firm level or
aggregate data, miss the sectoral spillovers, and thus may lead to misleading
conclusions.
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPILLOVER OF
SECTORAL FDI†

Introduction
The 2008 financial crises and extreme climate events such as floods, hurricanes and droughts that
the world has been experiencing with an increased frequency since the beginning of the 21st century
have one common message: with globalization, extreme events are no longer rare and can hit both
industrialized and developing economies alike. Just as the financial crisis that originated in the
United States has transformed into a global recession, the climate change that started a while ago
is being felt now throughout the world at an ever-increasing rate. The main difference is that unlike
recessions, a change in the climate may be irreversible.
The academic and public discourse link globalization and environment in several ways.
Globalization is blamed to degrade the environment through two channels. (i) The pollution haven,
or race-to-the bottom. Accordingly, with liberalized trade flows, businesses operating under tight
environmental regulation in developed countries can shift polluting industries to countries with lax
regulation; (ii) The “Environmental Kuznets Curve” (EKC), described by an inverse U-shaped
relation between pollution and income, states that economic growth (often associated with
globalization) increases pollution in low-income economies until they reach a certain level of
development, and decreases it thereafter. Both channels, however, are mitigated by the more recent
literature, which revealed a “halo effect”. The Halo Effect hypothesis states that multinational
companies disseminate superior knowledge and apply environmentally friendly practices while
improving the environmental performance of domestic business.
The globalization’s effect on the environment is mostly analyzed via the trade channel and
less so via the capital flows channel, and more specifically, the foreign direct investment (FDI).
All three effects can be triggered by multinational companies that invest in physical plants and
equipment, and contribute to the production and growth in host countries, as well as affecting the
environment. The view that multinationals impact the environment has its parallel in the literature
that examines the productivity gains generated by foreign firms investing in host country, via
spillovers of knowledge, knowhow, etc.
For a regulatory body it is crucial to know which effect is triggered by companies, whether
foreign or domestic. For business, especially those operating internationally, it is critical to know
its impact on carbon emissions and manage its risks. Business and investors are facing increased
restrictions and regulations from authorities forced to cut emissions. Managing the climategenerated risk is becoming an important objective of companies and therefore, many businesses
and insurers are supporting clear measures and regulations.
In this study, we propose to understand the impact of globalization on the host country’s
environment by examining the halo effect of FDI inflows, controlling for a number of factors that
may bias the results. More specifically, we analyze how sector-specific FDI inflows impact
pollution in the countries in our sample and test whether a halo effect is present. Our study shows
that unless it is considered at the sectoral level, the relation between foreign investment and the
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environment is not clear-cut. Our results help identify the sectors where more or less regulation is
required.
Contribution of this study to the literature
The review of the literature below highlights various drawbacks that prevent establishing a clear
relation between pollution and capital flows. First, most studies that examined the impact of
globalization on the environment considered these effects separately, with a plethora of data and
samples at the firm level or country level, which makes it difficult to draw any consistent
conclusion. Second, the methodology adopted is time-averaged cross-section approach, which is
inadequate to analyze a dynamic phenomenon such as greenhouse gas emissions with little or no
reversion. Finally, idiosyncratic shocks to different sectors may overweigh the regional shocks and
conceal differences at the industry level, and may explain the reason behind inconclusive results in
the literature. We address these drawbacks by adopting a unified framework and a dynamic model
that allows the analysis of all three effects over time and a long span of data covering multi-country
and industries. We identify the channels through which the halo effect manifests, controlling for
the type of FDI inflows, the EKC effect and the level of development of the economies.
The work on the environmental impact of total FDI uses an aggregate measure, which
conceals sectoral effects. At the other end of the spectrum, the analyses that examine the investment
decisions at the firm level miss the impact of these decisions, which can only be observed at the
more aggregate sectoral level and the intersectoral spillovers. Our industry analysis uses the largest
and the longest data span available. Growth studies have shown that FDI that flows to different
sectors have different impact on sectoral and aggregate growth, through spillovers to different
industries (Doytch and Uctum, 2011). Likewise, we expect different effect by different sectoral
FDI inflows on pollution (e.g., financial FDI might impact the environment even though it goes to
a non-polluting services industry).
Many of the previous studies struggle with endogeneity and simultaneity. The explanatory
variables used in the empirical studies are likely to influence each other, or the dependent variable
can affect the independent variables. For example, a country with restrictive environmental laws
may reduce pollution but they may be also a reaction to pollution; or pollution may change by FDI
but it can also determine the amount of FDI inflows. Independent variables may also affect each
other: laws may influence the flow of FDI, high growth in turn can encourage FDI and lead to
sectoral shifts in the economy impacting pollution. Such simultaneity problems can create
substantial biases in the estimates, which make results meaningless. To address these issue, we
adopt a dynamic panel data approach (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), a
methodology that circumvents similar problems.1 We instrument FDI and GDP, which addresses
endogeneity issues related to growth-FDI-pollution. Another advantage of the GMM estimator is
that it exploits both the time series dynamics and the pooled country characteristics of the data
while controlling for endogeneity and omitted variable biases. This allows us to retain the timeseries aspect of the data and the dynamic aspects of changes in the sectoral flows of FDI, a feature
that the traditional approach of the cross-sectional time-averaging methodology is not able to
capture. In addition, by breaking down the FDI data according to industries and categorizing the
economies according to time-varying country income levels (see below for more details) we
indirectly control for potential biases caused by sectoral shifts that occur due to economic
development.
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We show that results on the capital flow-pollution nexus depend critically on the type of
FDI flows and income distribution. First, we find a differential industry effect: while total foreign
investment in aggregate has a negative effect on all countries, this can be traced in particular to
capital flows to manufacturing and nonfinancial services sectors. Second, we uncover a striking
income inequality effect: foreign investment flowing into poorer countries has harmful effects on
environment consistent with the race-to-the bottom argument, while capital flowing to richer
countries has a beneficial effect and supports the halo effect. Third, we find that the EKC effect
depends on the sector absorbing the FDI and again income level of the country. Evidence supports
EKC effect (i.e. pollution decreases with economic development) in services in the full sample, in
low-income countries, and in manufacturing in high-income countries. In all other instances it is
not validated by the data.
Literature Review
The two hypotheses discussed above, the Halo Effect and the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)
are interrelated. The halo effect follows the productivity literature in spirit, which examines the
productivity spillovers by FDI, both at the firm and macroeconomic levels.2
Positive
environmental impact is triggered if the multinational corporations (MNCs) encourage the
dissemination of environmentally clean technologies and management practices. This occurs when
the foreign firm engages in contracts only with environmentally responsible domestic counterparts.
This may happen under shareholder pressure at the MNC or because of practices established by the
MNC’s home country environmental regulations and standards. Further environmental knowledge
can disseminate through the movement of trained workers from foreign to domestic firms (Görg
and Strobl, 2005) or because of a direct competition of domestic firms with the MNCs.
The literature on environmental impact of FDI confines mainly to case studies of specific
countries’ manufacturing industry firms. The evidence with respect to the halo hypothesis has been
mixed (Paigel and Wheeler, 1996). In a limited Indonesian manufacturing firms study conducted
for the period 1989-90 with respect to water pollution, Hartman et al. (1997) conclude that
"abatement... is... unaffected by foreign links (in ownership financing)". Dasgupta et al. (2000)
examine the impact of regulation, plant-level management policies, and other factors on the
environmental compliance of Mexican manufacturers and find no significance for the foreign
ownership variable as well.
More recently, however, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) analyze outbound US FDI and
find that foreign plants are significantly more energy efficient and cleaner in their energy uses
than their domestic partners, which supports the halo hypothesis. Another supporting evidence
for the halo hypothesis comes from the study by Cole et al. (2008) who assess the extent to which
foreign ownership influences the energy intensity in Ghana. The authors focus on the extent to
which workers with experience in a foreign owned firm transfer their knowledge to benefit the
local environment. They find the foreign training of firm's decision maker does reduce fuel use
especially in foreign owned firms.
Finally, in a sample of Argentinean firms, Albornoz et al (2009) find supporting evidence
that (i) foreign-owned firms are more likely to implement environmental management systems
compared to domestic firms; (ii) firms that supply sectors with high multinationals more likely
adopt environmental management systems; (iii) firms’ absorptive capacity, ownership and export
status also influence the extent to which they benefit from environmental spillovers.3
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Additional factors such as economic growth and exogenously imposed emission targets
also lead to a shift in the mix of sectoral capital flows. Our methodology controls to a large
extent for such exogenous factors. FDI and GDP are instrumented, which makes them exogenous
to pollution. We tested for the Kyoto protocol with a dummy and found no significant effect.
EKC, the second but the older line of research in environmental economics, states that the
quality of the environment worsens as the economy grows and once a certain threshold is reached,
it starts improving, resulting in an inverse U-shaped pollution-GDP per capita pattern. This line of
argument parallels that of the structural change in development whereby the share of manufacturing
in the economy grows in the initial phase of development but later decreases as the services
overtake the role of manufacturing in growth. The implication of EKC is that environmental quality
increases with economic growth after a threshold. The estimation model consists of the cubic or
quadratic income terms and their lagged values, and a vector of control variables including policy,
trade, and institutional variables. The initial research corroborated the EKC argument (Shafik,
1994, Grossman and Krueger, 1995, Holtz-Eaking and Selden, 1995, Hilton and Levinson, 1998).
More recent research, however casts doubt on the existence of a neat inverse U-shaped relation
(Stern, 1998, Harbaugh et al. 2002, Hettige et al. 2000).
As this brief overview of the literature indicates, most studies and in particular those in
environmental spillover literature are conducted at firm level. They give partial, industry-specific
insight into the experience of a given country. It is not surprising that literature cannot provide us
with a lesson about the global nature of capital flows, which could help us understand events in
other contexts. For this, a multi-country, sectoral approach is more appropriate. Our study remedies
this weakness and conducts such a sectoral level analysis of the impact of FDI on environmental
performance of domestic economies, measured by the levels of air pollution. 4
Conceptual framework
Our approach is in the spirit of Marcusen et al. (1995) extended to two imperfectly competitive
firms operating in two countries in a partial equilibrium model. A domestic and a foreign firm
compete in both markets with heterogeneous products that are imperfect substitutes for each
other. Each individual firm can affect the price of its own product in the market it is competing.
Each firm can choose whether to produce only domestically or to build plants in both countries
and produce both locally and in the foreign country. Following the literature, we will denote the
firm as “national” if it is producing domestically and as “multinational” if it is producing
domestically and in the foreign country. The model considers only horizontal FDI and ignores
vertical FDI following the evidence in the literature (see Markusen, 1995, Carr et al.,2001).
Pollution is a by-product of the production of goods as assumed in the literature and
created by local production. We keep the model as simple as possible and abstain from any
strategic considerations between firms or governments, or issues around abatement or spatial
effects. Pollution 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 at time t in country i depends on total production Q and on an exogenous
component D.
(1) 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷 + 𝜓𝜓𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
Total production in the host economy consists of the production of the domestic firm, which may
or may not be a multinational, and the production of the foreign multinational firm:
(2) 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖
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where X, 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 are, respectively, the domestic production of the domestic firm and the local
production of the foreign firm if it is a multinational, or its export to the domestic country if it is a
foreign-national firm. Since the goal of this study is to examine the environmental impact of FDI
inflows, we consider the specific case where the foreign firm is a multinational firm producing
both at home and in the host country and the domestic firm is a national firm that produces
locally. Both firms produce with the same technology using capital, K and labor, L and the
pollution level (𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 and 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 ) that minimize their cost. We consider pollution as an input to the
production process but it could also be equivalently considered as a joint production technology
(Siebert et al., 1980, Copeland and Taylor 2004). In a static equilibrium, ignoring the time
subscript the cost minimization of the domestic firm can be written as:
𝐶𝐶 = 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍
subject to the resource constraint:
𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼 𝐺𝐺(𝑅𝑅, 𝑊𝑊)1−𝛼𝛼 ≥ 𝑋𝑋�
𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 ≤ ���
𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷�
where G(.) is increasing, concave and homogenous, 0 <∝< 1, W, R and T denote the wage rate,
̅ are,
capital rental rate and cost (price) of pollution, 𝑋𝑋�is the target output level and 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 and 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷
respectively, pollution produced by domestic firm and the target or maximum allowable
emission level for this firm. Substituting the conditional demands into the production function
gives the optimal output of the domestic firm:
̅ , 𝑋𝑋�)
(3) 𝐻𝐻 = 𝐻𝐻(Γ, 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷
where Γ is a vector of domestic cost of production.
Foreign firm produces domestically and in the host country and thus contributes to
emissions in both countries. For its production in the host country, it uses the local labor and
pays the local wages. For its production in its home economy, it hires labor and pays salary of
the foreign country. Since goods are imperfect substitutes, the cost function is separable. The
foreign multinational firm minimizes
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 = �𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 + 𝑊𝑊 ∗ 𝑊𝑊∗ � + �𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑅𝑅 ∗ � + (𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 + 𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑍𝑍 ∗ )
Subject to:
1−𝛼𝛼

𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓𝛼𝛼 𝐹𝐹�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 �

≥ 𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓
𝑍𝑍 ∗𝛼𝛼 𝐹𝐹(𝑅𝑅 ∗ , 𝑊𝑊∗ )1−𝛼𝛼 ≥ 𝑋𝑋� ∗
𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 ≤ 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓̅
𝑍𝑍 ∗ ≤ 𝑍𝑍̅ ∗

To produce 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 in the host country the multinational firm employs labor from the host country, 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 ,
at the prevailing local cost, W and brings in FDI, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , which it rents at its home market at the rate
R*. It also produces X* in its home market with labor and capital, at the cost of W* and R*. Both
plants contribute to the emissions by 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 in the host country, and Z* in the home country of the
multinational where the firm faces similarly target levels of emissions and output, and pays a
price of T*. To focus on the pollution produced in the host country, we will ignore the production
activity of the multinational firm in its home country.
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We substitute the optimal factor demands into the production functions to get the optimal
output for each firm. After appropriate substitutions and log linearizing we can obtain a pollution
equation of the form:
(4) 𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝑥𝑥̅ + 𝛼𝛼4 ���
𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼5 ���
𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝑧𝑧�𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑓𝑓
where lower case-letters are the logs of the upper-case letters, f is FDI inflows (see Appendix 1
for the derivation and the definition of coefficients in the equation).
Methodology
Several FDI studies in the literature examine the impact of environmental regulation as an
independent variable. These studies belong to the strand of the literature emphasizing the
determinants of FDI. Our emphasis differs in the sense that what we want to examine is how capital
flows directly affect pollution in a country, while controlling for the EKC effect. It is clear that
these factors are simultaneously determined and their nonlinear interaction is not addressed. The
methodology outlined below is designed to control such biases.
To assess the impact of FDI and growth on pollution in a form comparable to the empirical
studies in the literature, we can transform the equation (4) as follows (see Appendix 1):
(5) 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖
where we used several assumptions: symmetric effect for each firm’s output and target emissions
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
����
𝜕𝜕𝑍𝑍
𝐷𝐷

on total pollution (

=

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑍𝑍�𝑓𝑓

and

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋�

=

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓

), and the identities 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑥𝑥̅ + 𝑥𝑥̅𝑓𝑓 and 𝑧𝑧 = 𝑧𝑧̅𝐷𝐷 + 𝑧𝑧̅𝑓𝑓 .

Although y is a vector that represents the country-fixed effects that proxy the production costs, it is
commonly defined to include additional control variables such as institutional and demographic
variables.
Equation (5) is based on a static optimization of the firm’s problem, which we use to guide us to
determine the control variables consistent with the ones used in the literature. In order to capture
the strong memory of pollution, as well as the EKC effect, we extend our model to include dynamic
effects. The estimated form that we adopt is therefore

2

𝑗𝑗

(6) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 � = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 log�𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 � + 𝛽𝛽2 log(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝛽3 �log�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 �� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽5 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
with µ i ~ i.i.d (0, σ µ ) , ε it ~ i.i.d.(0, σ ε ), E[ µiε it ] = 0 and where where i is the country subscript,
i

the subscript j stands for an index for total, agricultural, mining, manufacturing, total services,
financial services, non-financial services FDI. The variable 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 is a measure of air pollution, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
is log of per capita GDP, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑗𝑗 is the net capital inflow share of GDP. The remaining variables are
the explicit components of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 : The variable 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is “control of corruption”, a proxy for the
institutional variable. It is indexed between 1 and 10, 10 being the highest control of corruption;
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 represents population density, a proxy for demographic factors, 𝐷𝐷 𝑖𝑖 is a time dummy and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
is an idiosyncratic country specific effect.
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The level and the square of GDP capture the EKC hypothesis, 𝛽𝛽2 > 0, 𝛽𝛽3 < 0, which leads
to an inverse-U shaped relation between pol and y. For the halo effect to hold, the null hypothesis
is 𝛽𝛽4 < 0. We expect 𝛽𝛽5 < 0, that is, for an increase in the control of corruption to improve the
institutions of a country and hence to reduce pollution through more stringent regulation to protect
the environment, and 𝛽𝛽6 > 0, population density to increase the pollution level.
We use the GMM methodology because it is more suitable for our purposes. Panel data is
to be preferred to cross-sectional when analyzing change in the dependent variable because of the
correlation between lagged dependent variables and the unobserved residual. Cross-section
estimates produce a bias, caused by the correlation between poli ,t −1 and µ i , which disappears in
samples with large time-dimension but does not disappear with time-averaging. Thus, if such a
correlation exists, the true underlying structure has a dynamic nature and time-averaging crosssection techniques introduce a bias that cannot be removed by controlling for fixed-effects.
Therefore, to avoid these pitfalls, we adopt the GMM methodology.
A potential problem of the Arellano-Bond difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991)
estimator is that, under certain conditions, the variance of the estimates may increase asymptotically
and create considerable bias if: (i) the dependent variable follows a random walk, which makes the
first lag a poor instrument for its difference, (ii) the explanatory variables are persistent over time,
which makes the lagged levels weak instruments for their differences, (iii) the time dimension of
the sample is small (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1996 and Blundell and Bond, 1998). For these
reasons we are using the Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, and Blundell and Bond methodology. For
this, we transform the regression equation in first difference while including the lagged levels of
the dependent variable according to the lags in the instrumental matrix. Because of these lagged
level equations we are able to keep the fixed-country-effect in the regressions.
An additional necessary condition for the efficiency of the Blundell-Bond system GMM
estimator is that, even if the unobserved country-specific effect is correlated with the regressors’
levels, it is not correlated with their differences. The condition also means that the deviations of the
initial values of the independent variables from their long-run values are not systematically related
to the country-specific effects. 5 We instrument both income and FDI with GMM style instruments,
which will account for reverse causality between these variables and the pollution variable. 6 We
impose a limitation on the number of lags used to preserve degrees of freedom. We use three lags
and perform robustness checks removing the restriction on the lags.
Data and Sources
The data are yearly, multi-country, span a long period from 1984 to 2011, and come from various
sources. The key independent variables are disaggregated FDI flows share of GDP denominated
in current USD. All FDI series are net flows, accounting for the purchases and sales of domestic
assets by foreigners in the corresponding year. FDI is defined as investment that “reflects the
objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy (‘‘direct investor'') in
an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (‘‘direct investment enterprise'')”
(OECD, International direct investment database, Metadata). This lasting interest implies a longterm relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant influence on the
management of the enterprise. The data on sectoral FDI inflows to agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, financial services and nonfinancial services FDI are compiled from United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Organization for Economic Cooperation and
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Development (OECD), The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and individual
national statistical agencies web sites.
The dependent variable, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are from OECD and World
Development Indicators (WDI). CO2 emissions are defined as the emissions stemming from the
burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced
during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring. CO2 emissions are measured in
kilotons (kt).
Population density (people per sq. km of land area) is midyear population divided by land
area in square kilometers. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts
all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in
the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of
origin. Land area is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims
to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water
bodies includes major rivers and lakes.
Institutional variables are from the International Country Risk Group (ICRG). Following
the FDI and pollution literature, we adopted the control of corruption as an independent variable
and we conducted robustness check with law and order (see below). This measure is indexed from
0 to 6, 0 representing the countries with worst corruption and 6 representing countries with the best
practices. Corruption includes financial corruption, favoritism, nepotism, etc. Descriptive statistics
of all variables are presented in Table 1A and Table 2A in Appendix.
We use an income distribution country classification, provided by the World Bank. We
categorize all countries following the current World Bank income brackets for "Low"; "Lower
Middle"; "Upper Middle" and "High" income countries that are respectively GNI<=$1,045;
$1,045 < GNI<= $4,125; $4,125<GNI<= $12,736; and GNI >$12,736, where GNI, the gross
national income, is computed based on the "World Bank Atlas" method. Since there are few
observations in the lower-middle income category, we combine it with the low-income category
and label it “low-income” and label the World Bank’s "Upper-Middle Income" category as
"Middle-Income". Our last category "High-Income" countries is the same as that of the World
Bank.
Since our sample spans a long period of time, several countries move up the brackets during
this period. To account for the change in the income level of each economy, instead of taking the
income distribution among countries as static, we evaluate each country’s GNI at each time period
to determine the category it falls. This gives us a more appropriate time-varying income-level
classification. Appendix 2 displays the list of countries in the sample and the income categories
they fall in following our methodology.

Empirical Results
The idiosyncratic shocks to different sectors may overweigh the regional shocks, conceal
differences at the industry level, and may explain the reason behind inconclusive results in the
literature. Our aim is to expose such effects if they exist. For this, we now turn to analyzing the
impact on industry pollution of sectoral and aggregate FDI, given a set of control variables. We
examine the primary, secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (services) sectors by further
disaggregating the primary sector into agriculture and mining, and the tertiary sector into financial

Page | 8

and nonfinancial sectors. Our results below show substantial intersectoral differences not
detectable in the aggregate FDI data.
To control for heterogeneity caused by the level of development, we break down the data
according to income distribution measures and examine the same effects in four income categories
ranging from lowest to highest-income countries following the World Bank specification: lowincome, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income, high-income. Since the number of countries
in lower income category is small, we combine the low-income with the lower-middle-income
countries and report the combined results. Breaking down the data in three income categories
reveals stark differences between them. We find that poor countries’ environment is degraded by
capital inflows while that of the rich countries’ improves. These findings are consistent with the
argument that capital flows to countries with lax environmental restrictions.
To give an overall view of the estimated regression equation, Table 1 displays the full
regression results for aggregate and sectoral FDI for all countries. The full sample results are
broadly consistent with the expected signs of the coefficients. They indicate a strong persistence
effect (1st row), underlying the cumulative nature of environmental degradation.
In our analysis, we concentrate on the estimates of the pollution effect of FDI flows 𝛽𝛽4
(row 6). Results in aggregate, manufacturing and non-financial sectors suggest that flows into these
industries degrade the environment in the host country. A negative value suggests that the data
supports the Halo Effect hypothesis. In Table 1 we do not find evidence corroborating this
hypothesis. The breakdown with time-varying income distribution will help further disentangle
these results.
There is weak evidence supporting the EKC hypothesis when inflows of investment are in
the primary sector, services and at the aggregate level (rows 2, 3). The two other control variables,
corruption and population density are either insignificant or come with the wrong sign in the full
regression results. As we will see below, signs and significance vary at the sectoral level.
In Table 2 we summarize the estimate of 𝛽𝛽4 across sectors and income distribution. In
Table 3 we present the EKC estimates according to income distribution.
(i) FDI impact on pollution
The effect of total FDI on CO2 pollution
The first row in Table 2 reproduces the same results as row 6 in Table 1. Column 2 presents the
breakdown of the impact of total FDI on the environment according to income categories. The
impact of total capital flows in the full sample on environmental degradation (1st cell) is replicated
only in one income level. Evidence shows a significant positive impact in low-income countries,
suggesting that FDI inflows deteriorate the environment in the poorer countries, while they do not
have the same harmful impact in wealthy countries. Results at the aggregate level thus support the
view that capital flows to poorer countries and pollute the environment. How robust is this result
across industries? Next, we turn to the sectoral level analysis.
The effect of primary sector FDI on CO2 pollution
FDI inflows to both agriculture and mining do not have a significant effect on air pollution in the
full sample. (Table 2, first row, columns 2 and 3). However, the impact of capital flows in these
industries is clearly beneficial to the environment in the high-income countries corroborating the
halo hypothesis (row 4, columns 2 and 3). Capital flows to low- and middle-income countries do
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not have any significant effect. Thus, evidence supports the view that FDI inflows in agriculture
and mining, traditionally dirty industries, bring in clean technology in the wealthy countries.
The effect of manufacturing FDI on CO2 pollution
Most of the negative impact of capital inflows on air pollution in host countries is generated by
manufacturing FDI (column 4). Inflows of foreign investment into this sector raises the pollution
level significantly in the full sample (1st row). This result is traced back to both low and highincome countries where manufacturing FDI significantly pollutes the environment. Manufacturing
FDI is the only type of investment flow that does not benefit the rich countries.
The effect of tertiary sector FDI on CO2 pollution
In the full sample, the effect of FDI in services on the environment is insignificant (column 5, 1st
row). Yet this result conceals significant results at the more disaggregated levels. A halo effect in
the middle-income countries is strongly counteracted by a pollution-haven effect in the poorer
countries (row 2) and are mitigated at the aggregate level. The harmful effect in poorer countries
can be traced back to non-financial services (last column, row 2) and also shows up in full sample
(last column, first row). There is weak evidence that the halo effect in services in the middleincome countries is coming from the finance industry (column 6). In rich countries, by contrast,
both financial and nonfinancial service FDI significantly benefit the environment by bringing in
clean technology (columns 6 and7, last row).
Summary and discussion of results on the impact of sectoral FDI on CO2 pollution and income
distribution
Our findings can be interpreted in two ways: at the sectoral level and at the income distribution
level depending on whether the reader examines the results vertically or horizontally. Examining
the columns, at the industry level our results suggest that, foreign investment inflows into
manufacturing is most likely to increase pollution and refute the Halo Effect hypothesis. The
picture with the services is less straightforward and requires examination of the data by income
levels, which we do by considering the rows.
Poor countries’ environment is harmed by FDI flows that use dirty technologies in
manufacturing and services and more specifically, the nonfinancial services (2nd row). In the
middle-income countries, FDI inflows increase pollution in agriculture and mining but bring in
environmentally friendly technology in the service industry, most likely in finance (3rd row). By
contrast, rich countries benefit from all types of FDI inflows, except manufacturing, with a
significant effect in the financial services, nonfinancial services, and in agriculture and mining, and
enjoy the halo effect (last row). FDI inflows do not have a significant effect on middle-income
countries’ environment, except a halo effect in services.
(ii) The EKC hypothesis and alternative measures of pollution and robustness tests
The hypothesis that pollution worsens during the initial growth process followed by an
improvement as income rises is not strongly supported by the data (Table 3) but the results depend
on the type of capital flows the countries receive and their level of development. In the full sample
the EKC is present in countries receiving services FDI, which was also shown in Table 1. Poor
countries exhibit EKC effect when FDI flows to financial and nonfinancial services sector. EKC
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is strongly supported in high-income countries in manufacturing and weakly when we consider the
impact of total FDI. EKC is mostly inexistent in middle-income countries. In other words, EKC
is a phenomenon that appears mainly in poor and middle-income countries and mostly inexistent
in high-income countries, except when they host FDI in manufacturing, a traditionally dirty
industry.
Does FDI inflows change air pollution caused by particles other than CO2, such as SO2
(sulfur dioxide), NO2 (nitrogen dioxide) and CO (carbon monoxide)? Although most of the
discussion about man-made climate change centers around the impact of CO2, the other particles
are greenhouse gases directly generated by industrial pollutants. Since data are available only for
the OECD countries, we were able to conduct the analysis only at the sectoral level and not income
levels. We found that the halo effect is visible in services FDI also with SO2 and NO2 pollutants,
especially in nonfinancial flows, whereas financial FDI contributes to a decline in NO2. In contrast,
data reflects a bleak picture for the CO pollution. Evidence suggests that among OECD countries,
FDI flows into mining and services raises the levels of CO significantly in host countries, raising a
broader concern on FDI-induced air pollution.
We tried alternative measures of institutional variables. One such measure from the same
data source is law and order. Results were largely consistent but with fewer significant coefficients.
Since this is a variable more broadly defined and less precise than the corruption measure we used,
we thus favored the latter in line with the literature.
We also examined if the Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 by 191 countries and entered into
force in 2005 had any impact on the estimates and parameter stability. If the protocol had a
significant impact, possible changes we expected were an increase in the production costs of
polluting industries, therefore a decline in the positive coefficients, and/or a decrease in the costs
of clean industries and a rise in the negative coefficients. To our surprise, our results remained
unchanged. This may mean either that the protocol has been ineffective, or it did not have time to
work through the estimated coefficients.
Finally, we briefly review the remaining parameter estimates in the income categories. We
find that the persistence of pollution is highly robust to income distribution. Control of corruption
reduces pollution in poor countries if FDI flows in to services. In wealthy countries control of
corruption reduces pollution in the full sample and also if FDI flows in to manufacturing. The sign
of the estimate does not comes in with the expected sign at the aggregate level. Control of
corruption in general has no effect on environmental degradation in middle-income countries.
Population density increases pollution in the full sample and in poor countries when capital flows
in to services, but it has the opposite effect if it flows in services in middle-income and rich
economies and mining in high-income countries.
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Conclusion
The literature on the effect of globalization on the environment is ambiguous, partly due to
the range of different approaches followed and partly due to the drawbacks of methodologies. We
address these issues by adopting a unified framework and a dynamic model that allows the analysis
of various effects over time, and a long span of data covering multi-country and industries. Our
study tests the halo effect hypothesis, which argues that foreign direct investment is beneficial to
the host country because by bringing in clean technology and know-how, it improves the
environmental standards. We identify the channels through which the halo effect manifests by
controlling for the type of FDI inflows, the EKC effect and the time-varying income level of the
economies.
We find that results vary critically according to the type of capital flow and income
category. On aggregate, foreign investment that flows into manufacturing and nonfinancial
services tend to degrade the environment (negative halo effect). When data is disaggregated at the
income category level, our study shows that foreign investment benefits the environment in wealthy
countries across industries, but degrades it in poor countries. Thus evidence supports a halo effect
in rich countries and is consistent with the race-to-the bottom argument in low-income countries.
We also find that the traditional EKC results hold at an early level of development if capital flows
in to services sector. As countries become wealthier, EKC is supported if countries allow capital
inflows in traditionally dirty industries, such as manufacturing.
Our results thus suggest that studies relying simply on aggregate data or at the opposite
end, on firm level data, to analyze the relation between the environment and globalization miss the
subtle characteristics of the data due to complex interaction of sectoral flows and the environment.
These studies can lead to wrong or inconclusive inference and thus to misleading policy
prescriptions, with a long lasting impact.
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Notes
1. One notable exception is Frankel and Rose (2005), which examines the effect of trade on environment.
Endogeneity of trade and income is controlled for by instrumental variable approach within a cross-country
estimation in 1990. Although our approach is parallel to Frankel and Rose, it differs in several ways. First,
we do not take a single year of data but examine the evolution of the phenomenon through time, over the
course of 38 years. Second, our analysis is dynamic and not static. Third, our analysis is sectoral and thus
is able to capture the intersectoral spillovers.

2. Firm level studies find mixed evidence of productivity spillovers, ranging from limited positive to no or
negative spillovers. At the aggregate level, the evidence has been overwhelmingly in support of positive
impact by FDI inflows. The sectoral level analysis reconciles these inconsistent results. Manufacturing
FDI has positive spillovers that spur growth through its own sector, while financial services have a positive
effect that spreads though services, whereas nonfinancial services drain resources from manufacturing with
a negative effect on growth (see Doytch and Uctum, 2011 for a survey of the relevant literature and new
results).

3. The original pollution haven hypothesis (Copeland and Taylor, 1994) states that as trade is liberalized,
industries that pollute shift from rich countries with tight regulation to poor countries with weak regulation
and conversely, clean industries migrate towards rich countries. Although related to the halo effect, our
emphasis will not be on the impact of regulation on environment and investment decisions. For a survey of
the earlier literature see Jaffee et al. (1995) and more recent literature Dong et al. (2012) and Chung (2014).

4. The only study that examines the relationship of FDI by sectors with CO2 emissions is Blanco et al.
(2013). The study is specific to Latin America and the Caribbean and examines FDI in various
manufacturing industries. The study uses a simple Granger causality framework and finds a positive effect
of "dirty" sectors FDI on pollution, but does not look into intersectoral spillovers.
5. These sets of conditions are: (i) No second order autocorrelation in the error term:

E[ poli ,t − s (ε it − ε i ,t −1 )] = 0 for s≥2 and t=3,….T ; E[ yi ,t −s (ε it − ε i ,t −1 )] = 0 for s≥2 and t=3,….T;

E[ f i ,jt −s (ε it − ε i ,t −1 )] = 0 for s≥2 and t=3,….T, where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , f itj are the level of income and FDI, respectively
and where for instruments we use their past levels and differences. To instrument FDI and the lagged
output we used Stata’s GMM-style option, and to instrument the remaining variables, corruption and
elements of the 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 matrix, we used the iv-style option. (ii) No correlation of the unobserved countryspecific effect with their difference E[( poli ,t −1 − poli ,t − 2 )( µi + ε it )] = 0 ; E[( yi ,t −1 − yi ,t − 2 )( µi + ε it )] = 0 ;

E[( f i ,jt −1 − f i ,jt − 2 )( µi + ε it )] = 0 ; E[( f i ,jt −1 − f i ,jt − 2 )( µi + ε it )] = 0 ; (iii) The last condition allows using lagged first
differences as instruments for levels. Estimation is conducted on Stata with the xtabond 2 command.

6. We present here a set of results based on the minimum number of lags and a collapsed matrix for GDP
per capita, an approach suggested by Roodman (2009).
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Appendix 1
The optimal output of the multinational in the host country’s market is:
𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 = 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 [Γ𝑓𝑓 , 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓̅ , 𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓 ]
(1a)
where Γ𝑓𝑓 is a vector of cost of production of the multinational in the host country. Since 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 will be a
covariate in our reduced form pollution equation, we do not replace it in the output equation. The pollution
equation is obtained by substituting equations (2), (3), and (1a) into (1):
�
̅ �
̅ ̅ � �
𝑍𝑍 = 𝐷𝐷 + 𝜓𝜓�𝐻𝐻[Γ, �𝑍𝑍���
𝐷𝐷 , 𝑋𝑋 )] + 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 [Γ𝑓𝑓 , 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 , 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 ]� = 𝑍𝑍(𝐷𝐷, Γ, Γ𝑓𝑓 , 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 , 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 , 𝑋𝑋 , 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 )
Substituting for the optimal demand for FDI is equivalent to instrumenting 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 using factor prices. Instead,
the GMM methodology that we adopt computes internal instruments. The instrumental matrix consists of
lagged levels and lagged differences of FDI, where current levels of FDI are instrumented by lagged
differences and current differences of FDI are instrumented by lagged levels.
Log-linearizing both sides of the equation around the steady-state we get:
𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍
𝑍𝑍

=

𝐷𝐷 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷
𝑍𝑍 𝐷𝐷

+ 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓 �𝜖𝜖Γ

𝑑𝑑Γ
Γ

+ 𝜖𝜖𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷

𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍�𝐷𝐷
𝑍𝑍�𝐷𝐷

+ 𝜖𝜖𝑋𝑋

𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋�
𝑋𝑋�

� + 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜓𝜓) �𝜙𝜙Γf

𝑑𝑑Γf
Γf

+ 𝜙𝜙𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓

𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍�𝑓𝑓
𝑍𝑍�𝑓𝑓

+ 𝜙𝜙𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓

𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓
𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓

+ 𝜙𝜙𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓

𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓
𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓

�

where 𝜓𝜓, 1 − 𝜓𝜓 are the share of domestic firm’s and the multinational firm’s respective outputs in total
output Q; 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗 , 𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗 for 𝑗𝑗 = �Γ, 𝑍𝑍, 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 , 𝑋𝑋 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 � are, respectively, the elasticities of optimal output of domestic
and foreign firms with respect to j.
Integrating both sides and rearranging, we get the equation (4) in the text:
𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝑥𝑥̅ + 𝛼𝛼4 𝑥𝑥�𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼5 ���
𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝑧𝑧�𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑓𝑓
(2a)
where lower case variables are the natural logs of higher-case variables and the elasticities are defined as:
𝛼𝛼0 =

𝐷𝐷0
𝑍𝑍

;

𝛼𝛼4 = 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜓𝜓) 𝜙𝜙Xf ;

𝛼𝛼1 = 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓 𝜖𝜖Γ ;

𝛼𝛼2 = 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜓𝜓) 𝜙𝜙Γ𝑓𝑓 ;

𝛼𝛼3 = 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓 𝜖𝜖𝑋𝑋 ;

𝛼𝛼5 = 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓 𝜖𝜖𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷 ;

𝛼𝛼6 = 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜓𝜓) 𝜙𝜙𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 ;

𝛼𝛼7 = (1 − 𝜓𝜓)𝜙𝜙𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓

Assuming symmetric effect for costs, output and target emissions (𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼2 , 𝛼𝛼3 = 𝛼𝛼4 , 𝛼𝛼5 = 𝛼𝛼6 ) we can
rewrite equation (2a) as
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖
(3a)
where
𝑎𝑎0 =

𝛼𝛼0
𝛼𝛼5

𝑎𝑎1 =

1
𝛼𝛼5

𝑎𝑎3 =

𝛼𝛼7
𝛼𝛼5

and 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = [𝛾𝛾, 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓 ]
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Appendix 2: Country list by time-varying levels of development
Low &Lower Middle Income Countries
Albania: 1983-2007; Algeria: 1983-2007; Angola: 1983-2011; Azerbaijan: 1983-2008; Bangladesh: 19832011; Belarus: 1983-2006; Bolivia: 1983-2011; Burkina Faso: 1983-2011; Cameroon: 1983-2011; China:
1983-2009; Colombia: 1983-2006; Congo, Rep.: 1983-2011; Cote d'Ivoire: 1983-2011; Dominican Republic:
1983-2007; Ecuador: 1983-2009; Egypt, Arab Rep.: 1983-2011; Ethiopia: 1983-2011; Gambia, The: 19832011; Ghana: 1983-2011; Guatemala: 1983-2011; Guinea: 1983-2011; Guinea-Bissau: 1983-2011; Guyana:
1983-2011; Haiti: 1983-2011; Honduras: 1983-2011; India: 1983-2011; Indonesia: 1983-2011; Iran: 19832007; Iraq: 1983-2009; Jamaica: 1983-2004; Jordan: 1983-2010; Kenya: 1983-2011; Liberia: 1983-2011;
Morocco: 1983-2011; Moldova: 1983-2011; Madagascar: 1983-2011; Mali: 1983-2011; Mongolia: 19832011; Mozambique: 1983-2011; Malawi: 1983-2011; Namibia: 1983-2006; Nicaragua: 1983-2011; Niger:
1983-2011; Nigeria: 1983-2011; Pakistan: 1983-2011; Peru: 1983-2009; Philippines: 1983-2011; Papua New
Guinea: 1983-2011; Paraguay: 1983-2011; Sudan: 1983-2011; Suriname: 1983-2011; El Salvador: 19832011; Senegal: 1983-2011; Sierra Leone: 1983-2011; Somalia: 1983-2011; South Africa: 1983-2004; Sri
Lanka: 1983-2011; Syria: 1983-2011; Togo: 1983-2011; Thailand: 1983-2009; Tunisia: 1983-2008;
Tanzania: 1983-2011; Uganda: 1983-2011; Ukraine: 1983-2011; Vietnam: 1983-2011; Zambia: 1983-2011;
Zimbabwe: 1983-2011; Congo, DR.: 1983-2011.
Upper Middle Income Countries
Albania: 2008-2011; Algeria: 2008-2011; Argentina: 1983-2011; Armenia: 1983-2011; Azerbaijan: 20092011; Belarus: 1907-2011; Botswana: 1983-2011; Brazil: 1983-2011; Bulgaria: 1983-2011; Chile: 19832011; China: 2010-2011; Colombia: 2007-2014; Costa Rica: 1983-2011; Dominican Republic: 2008-2011;
Ecuador 2010-2011; Gabon: 1983-2011; Croatia: 1983-2007; Iran: 2008-2011; Iraq: 2010-2011; Jamaica:
2005-2011; Jordan: 2011; Kazakhstan: 1983-2011; Lebanon: 1983-2011; Libya: 1983-2011; Latvia: 19832006; Lithuania: 1983-2007; Mexico: 1983-2011; Montenegro: 1983-2011; Malaysia: 1983-2011; Namibia:
2007-2011; Oman: 1983-2006; Panama: 1983-2011; Peru: 2010-2011; Poland: 1983-2010; Romania: 19832011; Russian Federation: 1983-2011; Serbia: 1983-2011; Slovakia: 1983-2005; South Africa: 2005-2011;
Thailand: 2010-2011; Tunisia: 2009-2011; Turkey: 1983-2011; Uruguay: 1983-2011; Venezuela: 19832011.
High Income Countries:
Australia: 1983-2011; Austria: 1983-2011; Bahamas: 1983-2011; Bahrain: 1983-2011; Belgium: 1983-2011;
Brunei Darussalam: 1983-2011; Canada: 1983-2011; Cyprus: 1983-2011; Czech Republic: 1983-2011;
Denmark: 1983-2011; Estonia: 1983-2011; Finland: 1983-2011; France: 1983-2011; Germany: 1983-2011;
Greece: 1983-2011; Hong Kong, China: 1983-2011; Hungary: 1983-2011; Iceland: 1983-2011; Croatia:
2008-2011; Ireland: 1983-2011; Israel: 1983-2011; Italy: 1983-2011; Japan: 1983-2011; Korea, Rep.: 19832011; Kuwait: 1983-2011; Lithuania: 2008-2011; Latvia: 2007-2011; Luxembourg: 1983-2011; Malta: 19832011; Netherlands 1983-2011; New Caledonia: 1983-2011; New Zealand: 1983-2011; Norway: 1983-2011;
Oman: 2007-2011; Poland: 2011; Portugal: 1983-2011; Qatar: 1983-2011; Saudi Arabia: 1983-2011;
Singapore: 1983-2011; Slovakia: 2006-2011; Slovenia: 1983-2011; Spain: 1983-2011; Sweden: 1983-2011;
Switzerland: 1983-2011; Trinidad and Tobago: 1983-2011; UAE: 1983-2011; UK: 1983-2011; US: 19832011.
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Appendix Table 1A: Summary Statistics of Sectoral FDI by Country Level of Development
All Countries

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Total FDI share of GDP
Agricultural FDI share of GDP

6348
1341

0.038
0.001

0.194
0.011

Mining FDI share of GDP

1552

0.009

0.031

Manufacturing FDI share of GDP

1909

0.007

0.026

Total Services FDI share of GDP

1711

0.037

0.270

Financial Services FDI share of GDP

1553

0.024

0.272

Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP

1307

0.017

Low-Income Countries

Obs.

Mean

0.036
Std.
Dev.

Total FDI share of GDP
Agricultural FDI share of GDP

3487
481

0.03
0.003

0.121
0.017

Mining FDI share of GDP

581

0.014

0.042

Manufacturing FDI share of GDP

606

0.007

0.009

Total Services FDI share of GDP

618

0.013

0.017

Financial Services FDI share of GDP

471

0.003

0.007

Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP

417

0.011

Middle-Income Countries

Obs.

Mean

0.014
Std.
Dev.

Total FDI share of GDP
Agricultural FDI share of GDP

1088
335

0.039
0.001

0.065
0.003

Mining FDI share of GDP

376

0.007

0.016

Manufacturing FDI share of GDP

464

0.009

0.01

Total Services FDI share of GDP

439

0.024

0.035

Financial Services FDI share of GDP

421

0.008

0.013

Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP

378

0.017

High-Income Countries

Obs.

Mean

0.027
Std.
Dev.

Total FDI share of GDP
Agricultural FDI share of GDP

1773
525

0.054
0.001

0.321
0.007

Mining FDI share of GDP

595

0.005

0.025

Manufacturing FDI share of GDP

839

0.006

0.038

Total Services FDI share of GDP
Financial Services FDI share of GDP
Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP

654
661
512

0.068
0.050
0.022

0.434
0.416
0.051
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Table 2A: Summary Statistics as of the beginning and end of the period (years 1984
and 2011).

Variable

Obs,
1984

Mean,
1984

Std.
Dev.,
1984

Obs,
2011

Mean,
2011

Std.
Dev.,
2011

GDP per capita, 2005 $

148

8655.45

13855.07

182

10684.09

15570.78

Anticorruption Index

112

3.242

1.557

139

2.684

1.131

Population Density

204

293.124

1473.61

213

400.832

1898.149

Total FDI share of GDP

129

0.007

0.016

174

0.093

0.545

Agricultural FDI share of GDP

13

0.012

0.043

48

0.0008

0.002

Mining FDI share of GDP

10

0.004

0.005

65

0.006

0.012

Manufacturing FDI share of GDP

24

0.004

0.009

72

0.007

0.020

Total Services FDI share of GDP

22

0.001

0.001

71

0.133

0.847

Financial Services FDI share of GDP

10

0.0002

0.0007

58

0.133

0.916

Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP

7

0.001

0.001

55

0.026

0.058
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Table 1*: Full regression results “All countries”

Total
FDI/GDP

Agricult
ure
FDI/GDP

Mining
FDI/GDP

Manuactur.
FDI/GDP

Services
FDI/GDP

Finance
FDI/GDP

Nonfinancial
FDI/GDP

𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝟐𝟐𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 )

1.006***
(80.50)

0.999***
(117.32)

1.001***
(114.37)

1.008***
(113.60)

1.015***
(101.99)

0.996***
(83.41)

1.004***
(105.52)

𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)

0.182
(1.07)

0.068
(0.51)

0.082
(0.82)

-0.122
(-0.95)

0.184
(1.42)

0.106
(0.58)

-0.023
(-0.13)

[𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐

-0.011
(-1.08)

-0.007
(-0.86)

-0.007
(-1.27)

0.004
(0.66)

-0.013*
(-1.69)

-0.008
(-0.85)

0.000
(0.03)

𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒐 𝒄𝒄𝒍𝒍𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒑𝒑𝒕𝒕𝒄𝒄𝒍𝒍𝑪𝑪

-0.008
(-0.64)

0.038**
(1.98)

0.028*
(1.95)

0.015
(1.10)

0.019
(1.35)

0.029**
(2.08)

-0.001
(-0.12)

𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝑮𝑮𝑹𝑹𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑫𝑫)

-0.003
(-0.78)

0.000
(0.01)

0.000
(0.04)

-0.003
(-1.06)

-0.000
(-0.01)

-0.001
(-0.13)

-0.004
(-1.00)

𝑭𝑭𝑮𝑮𝑭𝑭
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 �
�
𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏

0.022*
(1.82)

-0.003
(-0.51)

0.003
(0.49)

0.015*
(1.62)

0.004
(0.67)

0.002
(0.23)

0.024**
(2.19)

Number of Observations

3037

847

1117

1432

1291

1179

991

Number of Countries

132

82

87

94

93

83

82

AR(2)

0.265

0.132

0.045

0.144

0.095

0.452

0.540

Sargan Test

0.002

0.000

0.993

0.558

0.369

0.014

0.583

Log CO2 All countries

* Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; * and ** denote significance at the 10 % and 5 % respectively.
Results are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Page | 20

New Table 2: Effect of FDI on CO2 emissions with time-varying income levels*

Total
FDI/GDP

Agriculture
FDI/GDP

Mining
FDI/GDP

Manufact.
FDI/GDP

Services
FDI/GDP

Finance
FDI/GDP

Nonfinancial
FDI/GDP

All countries

0.022*
(1.82)

-0.003
(-0.51)

0.003
(0.49)

0.015*
(1.61)

0.004
(0.67)

0.002
(0.23)

0.024**
(2.19)

Observations
Countries
AR(2)
Sargan Test

3037
132
0.265
0.002

847
82
0.132
0.000

1117
87
0.045
0.993

1432
94
0.144
0.558

1291
93
0.095
0.369

1179
83
0.452
0.014

991
82
0.540
0.583

Low-income
countries

0.032**
(2.03)

-0.003
(-0.63)

-0.003
(-0.70)

0.016**
(1.95)

0.034***
(3.77)

-0.003
(-0.48)

0.026***
(3.81)

Observations
Countries
AR(2)
Sargan Test

1488
65
0.875
0.001

316
34
0.252
0.000

411
33
0.376
0.941

434
36
0.580
0.049

445
36
0.414
0.410

314
29
0.696
0.020

287
28
0.561
0.143

0.002
(0.45)

0.004
(0.64)

0.005
(0.90)

0.001
(0.19)

-0.009*
(-1.72)

-0.013
(-1.04)

-0.004
(-0.32)

Observations
Countries
AR(2)
Sargan Test

579
44
0.339
0.051

222
25
0.070
0.000

277
29
0.068
0.928

333
30
0.465
0.000

308
30
0.380
0.000

301
28
0.661
0.000

252
27
0.153
0.010

High-income
countries

-0.006
(-0.56)

-0.007*
(-1.75)

-0.017**
(-2.20)

0.022**
(2.40)

0.001
(0.19)

-0.011**
(-2.22)

-0.015*
(-1.82)

Observations
Countries
AR(2)
Sargan Test

970
47
0.135
0.254

309
35
0.218
0.040

429
39
0.081
0.979

665
42
0.164
0.880

538
41
0.179
0.656

564
39
0.292
0.008

452
39
0.238
0.460

𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝟐𝟐

Middle-Income
countries

* The first entry in each cell is the estimate of the effect on pollution of FDI flows, estimated by the
System GMM method. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; * and ** denote significance at the 10 %
and 5 % respectively. Results are robust to heteroscedasticity.
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Table 3 : Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) with CO2 emissions*

With Time-varying income levels
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝟐𝟐

Total
FDI/GDP

Agriculture
FDI/GDP

0.182
(1.07)

0.068
(0.51)

-0.011
(-1.08)

-0.007
(-0.86)

Mining
FDI/GDP

Manufact.
FDI/GDP

Services
FDI/GDP

Finance
FDI/GDP

Nonfinancial
FDI/GDP

0.082
(0.82)

-0.122
(-0.95)

0.184
(1.42)

0.106
(0.58)

-0.023
(-0.13)

-0.007
(-1.27)

0.004
(0.66)

-0.013*
(-1.69)

-0.008
(-0.85)

0.000
(0.03)

All countries
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)

[𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐

Low-income countries
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)
[𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐

0.335
(0.69)

0.518
(1.24)

-0.436**
(-2.45)

-0.439*
(-1.89)

0.215
(0.43)

0.409*
(1.62)

0.681*
(1.66)

-0.027
(-0.77)

-0.039
(-1.38)

0.032**
(2.39)

0.028*
(1.72)

-0.014
(-0.40)

-0.030*
(-1.62)

-0.049*
(-1.69)

Middle-income countries
-0.750
(-0.59)

0.026
(0.02)

1.279
(1.33)

0.977
(0.72)

-1.766
(-0.99)

-1.602
(-0.71)

-1.682
(-0.90)

[𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐

0.042
(0.57)

-0.004
(-0.06)

-0.076
(-1.34)

-0.058
(-0.75)

0.101
(0.98)

0.092
(0.70)

0.096
(0.89)

𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)

2.226
(1.57)

0.325
(0.53)

0.197
(0.25)

0.952*
(1.94)

0.829
(1.05)

-0.106
(-0.24)

-0.081
(-0.27)

[𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐

-0.110
(-1.58)

-0.018
(-0.58)

-0.012
(-0.31)

-0.047*
(-1.90)

-0.044
(-1.08)

0.003
(0.15)

0.002
(0.18)

𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)

High-income countries

* Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; * and ** denote significance at the 10 % and 5 % respectively.
Results are robust to heteroscedasticity
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